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Some names, specifically the proper names by which people are called, are
considered “a mess” by at least one prominent contemporary philosopher.1
Looking at the matter from the perspective of medieval philosophy, we
might say that the reason such names are semantically ill-behaved is that the
act of naming from which they derive is not one of adequate naming.
Moreover, supposing that all manner of beings, including people, are
The research that led to this paper could not have been undertaken without
the wonderful generosity of Professor Rega Wood, the general editor of Rufus’s
works. She has provided me with transcriptions of entire short treatises by Rufus
and of sections of his longer works. I cannot adequately express my gratitude to her
for having graciously allowed me to benefit from an awesome amount of unpub-
lished work. For her astute and enormously helpful comments on an earlier paper,
from which this one derives, I owe her even further thanks. That paper served as
the basis for a talk delivered at a session of the Tenth International Congress of
Medieval Philosophy, held at Erfurt, August 25–30, 1997.
I am, moreover, deeply grateful to the editor of this journal, Professor Scott
MacDonald, for having greatly enhanced the crispness of my style and thereby
improved the clarity of the present paper.
1. Although I quote from a number of Rufus’s works, there are two on which
this paper is primarily based, both written when Rufus was a master of Arts in Paris,
before 1238. I refer to the first as the Urmetaphysics. The second is a two-part treatise
which Professor Wood has called the Contra Averroem. The Urmetaphysics is Rufus’s
first commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, only very recently discovered by Profes-
sor Wood. It is to be distinguished from his second Metaphysics commentary which
I refer to as the Main Metaphysics Commentary. The Contra Averroem is comprised of
“De ideis” and “De causa individuationis,” of which “De ideis” deserves a special
mention. Discovered by Professor Timothy Noone, it was first transcribed by Noone
and Wood in 1990. Recently, Professor Noone has kindly sent me a revised transcrip-
tion, for which I am very grateful. This transcription is quoted here.
With the exception of “De ideis,” all quotations from Rufus are based on
transcriptions made or revised by Professor Wood. Citations will indicate the rele-
vant folio numbers of the manuscript or manuscripts on which the transcription is
based. The manuscript itself, when first referred to, will be identified by the name
of the city in which the library which houses it is located, the abbreviated name of
the library, and its codex number.
“All in all, proper names are a mess and if it weren’t for the problem of how to
get the kids to come for dinner, I’d be inclined to just junk them” (David Kaplan,
“Dhat,” Syntax and Semantics, vol. 9, ed. Peter Cole; repr. in Contemporary Perspectives
in the Philosophy of Language, ed. P. French et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minne-
sota Press, 1979, pp. 383–400, p. 386).
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“things,” we might let adequate naming be governed by the following
principle: an agent adequately names a thing if and only if, knowing its
proper nature, she bestows a name on the thing by considering that nature.
Obviously, on this principle, the acts of naming from which people in our
societies derive their names are not acts of adequate naming.
Still taking a medieval stance, we might grant that only a universal—a
natural kind, for example—is such that its proper nature is knowable. If one
grants this, one would have to conclude that only universals can be ade-
quately named. A thirteenth-century Aristotelian, interpreting Aristotelian
metaphysics and epistemology as philosophers then were inclined to do,
might take a position of this sort. Alternatively, we might grant that not only
universals but also individuals are such that their proper nature is knowable.
If one takes this line, one would have to conclude that individuals, too, can
be adequately named. A Christian philosopher, believing that the proper
nature of an individual is knowable since it is known by God, might take a
position of this sort.
Richard Rufus was both an Aristotelian philosopher of the thirteenth
century and a Christian philosopher.2 He granted the principle of adequate
naming. It is hardly suprising, then, that he was attracted by both the
Aristotelian and Christian positions on the issue of what can be adequately
named. What is surprising, however, is that he changed his mind on the
subject, first supporting the purely Aristotelian viewpoint, and, shortly
thereafter, the more Christian one. He thus changed his mind on the
possibility of adequately naming individuals, though not on that of ade-
quately naming universals, a possibility he had no reason to question. In this
paper I examine Rufus’s views on these issues at the convergence of meta-
physics, epistemology, and semantics. I discuss both his views on universals,
which he consistently maintained, and on individuals, which he revised.
First, however, I need to qualify my description of Rufus’s position.
For, although he admitted extra-mental universals, Rufus thought it im-
proper to call them “universals,” preferring instead to call them “common
natures.” According to him, the term “universal” properly denotes not a
common nature but its idea.3 More importantly, where he discusses the
2. There are a number of articles on Richard Rufus and one book-length
study: Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Tradition of Oxford Theology, by Peter Raedts
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). That very interesting book, which contains many
excerpts from Rufus’s works, still provides a valuable introduction to Rufus’s life,
works, and thought. However, it needs updating as research on Rufus has made
much progress since it was written. Fortunately, that need will soon be met. Profes-
sor Wood, the person who has contributed most to recent research on Rufus, is
working on a book: Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Origins of Scholasticism. Eagerly
awaited, that book will establish the authenticity of a number of works by Rufus
recently discovered by Professor Wood (some of which are quoted here).
3. “Prout [forma] consideratur ut ens in multis . . . proprie significatur per
hoc quod dico ‘commune.’ . . . Ipsa autem secundum hoc esse potest dici univer-
sale, licet minus proprie quam secundum esse quod habet in anima” (Main Meta-
physics Commentary, bk. VII, Erfurt, Wiss. Allg., Q290, fol. 21rb, ed. R. Wood).
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possibility of adequately naming a thing, be it a common nature or an
individual, he considers only things in the category of substance. Thus,
what we find in his writings are discussions of the possibility of adequately
naming, not common natures or individuals in general, but those com-
mon natures that are secondary substances (genera or species in the cate-
gory of substance) and those individuals that are primary substances.
Finally, what I am calling “adequate naming,” he would have called simply
“naming,” for he considered, in effect, that only adequate naming is, prop-
erly speaking, naming and that only a name that is the result of adequate
naming, a name which has been bestowed on a thing by an agent con-
sidering the thing’s nature, is, properly speaking, a name.4 I do not follow
Rufus’s usage here, however. Rather than packing the notion of adequate
naming into the meaning of the term “name,” I prefer to speak of ade-
quate naming.
Given these qualifications, we can state the views I propose to examine
as follows. According to Rufus, it is unquestionable that we can adequately
name secondary substances, but it is questionable whether we—or any
intelligent being—can adequately name primary substances. On the latter
issue Rufus changed his mind, first thinking it impossible that a primary
substance be adequately named, but ultimately preferring the view that
primary substances are adequately nameable by God, though not by us (at
least in this life). This paper has two main sections. In the first, I give an
account of Rufus’s views on the adequate nameability of secondary sub-
stances. In the second section, I explain, in turn, the two views he held on
the adequate nameability of primary substances.
1. THE ADEQUATE NAMEABILITY
OF SECONDARY SUBSTANCES
Rufus never doubted that secondary substances are adequately nameable.
For he believed that we humans are, at least in  principle, capable  of
knowing the proper nature of any secondary substance and therefore of
adequately naming it. To understand why he held this belief, we need to
know what, in his view, the proper natures of secondary substances are, and
4. “considerant naturam impositionis per naturam rei . . .” (Urmetaphysics, VII,
q. 13, Erfurt, Wiss. Allg., Q290, fol.49rb, ed. R. Wood). Apparently, Peter Abelard
already had a similar view on names: “qui vocabulum invenit, prius rei naturam
consideravit ad quam demonstrandum nomen imposuit” (Glosses on Aristotle’s Cate-
gories, in Peter Abailards Philosophische Schriften, ed. B. Geyer, Beiträge zur Geschichte der
Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, XXI-2 (Münster: Verlag der Aschen-
dorfschen Verlagsbuchhandlung 1921), p. 112).
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on what basis he thought humans capable of knowing them. Accordingly, it
is to Rufus’s metaphysics of secondary substances that we must turn first.
1.1. Metaphysical Background
The conception of secondary substances—genera and species in the cate-
gory of substance—to which Rufus subscribed presupposes a realist frame-
work of a certain type. This framework can be conveniently described by
relating it to a certain interpretation of the Porphyrian tree for the category
of substance.5 The relevant interpretation of the tree rests on two main
assumptions.
First, it assumes that the tree pictures how the most general substance
(the genus substance) divides by successive dichotomies into less and less
general substances until the least general secondary substances are
reached. These are the ultimate species in the category of substance. Ulti-
mate species also divide, but not into two less general secondary substances,
as the species and genera above them do; rather, they divide into a multi-
tude of individuals or primary substances. Second, it assumes that the tree
also indicates those causes, as it were, which determine the division of each
secondary substance (other than the ultimate species) into two less general
secondary substances. It does this by representing pairs of further entities,
the so-called “differentiae.” For example, the tree indicates that the differ-
entiae rationality and irrationality determine the division of the genus animal
into two species: rational animal (or man) and irrational animal. Since the
tree provides no information about the causes that determine the division
of an ultimate species into its many individual substances, it may be re-
garded as explaining the genealogy, as it were, of each ultimate species in
the category of substance, but not of the individuals into which the ultimate
species divide.
Conceiving of secondary substances within this framework, Rufus as-
sumes that they are not simple entities but aggregates of matter and one or
more forms. Both the matter and the forms of a given secondary substance
are, of course, themselves general. The matter is more or less general,
depending on whether it is a component of a more or less general secon-
dary substance. Moreover, the forms are more or less numerous: more
general substances have fewer component forms, less general substances
have  more.  Thus,  every  secondary  substance (except ultimate species)
divides into two further secondary substances, each of which differs from it
by having a less general matter and by having one more form. The secon-
5. Partial representations of the Porphyrian tree in the category of substance
are found in many early printed editions of medieval commentaries on Porphyry’s
Isagage. Any representation of the tree is, of course, necessarily partial, since we do
not have knowledge of all the genera and species—let alone all the individuals—in
the category of substance.
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dary substance body, for example, divides into animate body (or animal) and
inanimate body. Animal differs from body by having a less general matter and
one more form, animality, in addition to the forms of substantiality and
corporality which it shares with the substance body.6
Every secondary substance (other than the most general one, the
genus substance) thus arises from a more general secondary substance. The
metaphysical process by which this occurs has as its cause one of the two
opposite differentiae that together divide the more general substance.7
Rufus  holds that  each differentia acts on the more general secondary
substance in the following way. It “contracts” the form proper to the more
general substance so that a less general form ensues.8 This new form in turn
causes a new substance to arise. It does this by “perfecting” the matter of
the more general substance “more completely” than its own form was
capable of doing, that is, by making it more particular.9 This more particular
matter is the matter of the new substance which has the contracted form as
its proper form. The new substance shares all the forms belonging to the
more general substance.10 But it has in addition its own proper form. For
example, the genus animal has animality as its proper form (and shares the
forms of the higher genus corporal substance). It is divided into man and
irrational animal by the differentiae rationality and irrationality. Rationality
contracts the form of animality into that of humanity, which in turn renders
more particular the matter of the genus animal. In this way, the ultimate
species man emerges, which has a more particular matter than the genus
animal and a proper form, that of humanity. It follows, then, that as Rufus
conceives them, secondary substances each have their own proper matter
and their own proper form.
6. “Item, nonne substantia materiae primae omnium formarum primo re-
cipit eam quae generis generalissimi . . .? Ipsa [substantia materiae] ergo sub sola
forma generis generalissimi, circumscriptis aliis specialoribus formis, ipsa, inquam,
sive illud aggregatum, nec species est nec individuum. Immo super illud aggre-
gatum adduntur formae per ordinem . . ., quarum quaelibet substantiam dictae
materiae plus et plus signat, contrahit, appropriat” (Contra Averroem II [“De causa
individuationis”], Erfurt, Wiss. Allg., Q. 312, fol. 85va, ed. R. Wood).
7. “differentiae contrariae species differentes constituunt . . .” (Lectura
Parisiensis in libros Sententiarum II, d.3, a.1 [“De materia angelorum”], Vat. Lat.
12993, fol. 145va, ed. R. Wood).
8. I infer that this was Rufus’s view. For Rufus (in the Contra Averroem)
compares what he calls an “added virtue,” which is supposed to contract a maximally
specific form into an individual form, with a differentia. But the comparison is
pointless unless a differentia is that which contracts a more general form into a
more specific one (see the text quoted in n. 41 below).
9. “Quaedam [forma] completius et quaedam minus complete materiam
perficit . . .” (Contra Averroem II [“De causa individuationis”], fol. 85va).
10. “differentiae contrariae species differentes constituunt, in quibus tamen
salvatur et manet eadem forma generis univoca.” (Lectura Parisiensis . . . II, d.3, a.1
[“De materia angelorum”] fol. 145va).
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1.2. Knowing and Naming
It further follows that one can identify the proper nature of a secondary
substance both with its proper matter and with its proper form. It would
seem, then, that a secondary substance is adequately named by an agent,
provided that the agent, knowing either its proper matter or its proper
form, has bestowed a name on the substance by considering either the one
or the other. That is indeed what Rufus acknowledges, quickly adding,
however, that the first alternative is, in fact, unavailable.11 For he claims
(agreeing here with Aristole) that matter cannot be known, at least not in
itself.12 That leaves only the second alternative open, so that we will have to
say that a secondary substance is adequately named by an agent provided
that agent knows its proper form and bestows a name on the substance by
considering that form. That, too, is what Rufus claims: “because its form is
the principle of intelligibility of a thing, a name is bestowed on a thing in
virtue of its form.”13
Despite his talking about “things” here, Rufus probably intends to refer
to those things that are secondary substances. For he draws as a conse-
quence the further claim that a name names a form primarily and the
aggregate of which that form is the proper form secondarily.14 Moreover,
when he illustrates this second claim, he does so by mentioning names of
secondary substances.15 This suggests that in the first claim he meant to
refer to secondary substances as well.
Hence, we may reformulate the principle of adequate naming so that
it applies to secondary substances as Rufus conceives them: a secondary
substance is adequately named by an agent if and only if that agent has
bestowed a name on the substance by considering its proper form. Since
every secondary substance has a proper form, it follows that every secon-
dary substance fulfills its part of the condition for it to be adequately
named. If it can be shown that there are agents capable, at least in principle,
11. “si materia per se esset intelligibilis, per se esset nominabilis, et tunc posset
adeo vere nomen imponi a materia, sicut nunc imponitur a forma” (Urmetaphysics
VII, q. 13, fol. 49rb).
12. “materia non est intelligibilis nisi per accidens, ut habetur in primo Physi-
corum, sicut privatio et tenebra . . .” (Contra Averroem I [“De ideis”], q.1, Erfurt, Wiss.
Allg., Q312, fol. 81va, Prague, Archiv Prazskeho hradu - Kap. Kn., M 80, fol. 33ra,
ed. T. Noone).
13. “cum forma sit principium intelligendi rem, propterea a forma imponitur
nomen . . .” (Urmetaphysics VII, q.13, fol. 49rb).
14. “nomen non significat nisi principaliter formam, secundario aggregatum”
(Contra Averroem I [“De ideis”], ad q.1, E [for ‘Erfurt, Wiss. Allg., Q. 312’], fol. 84va,
P [for ‘Prague, Archiv Prazskeho hradu - Kap. Kn., M 80’], fol. 36rb).
15. “Hoc nomen ‘caelum’ vel ‘homo’ re vera primo et principaliter significat
formam, secundario aggregatum ex forma communi et materia communi” (Contra
Averroem II [“De causa individuationis”], fol. 85vb).
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of knowing the proper form of any given secondary substance, it will be
established that every secondary substance is adequately nameable.
Now, according to Rufus, we humans are agents capable of the re-
quired knowledge. For what is it to know the proper form of a secondary
substance? It is to be able to provide a metaphysical account of that form.
But that is precisely what we do, Rufus thinks, whenever we provide a
definition of a secondary substance. For although it is a secondary sub-
stance (species or intermediate genus) which is said to be defined, the
account provided by the definition is a metaphysical account, not exactly of
the secondary substance itself, but of its proper form.16 For the definition
makes no mention of matter, which is one of the metaphysical constituents
of every secondary substance.17 For example, the definition of the secon-
dary substance man as “rational animal” does not provide an account of that
substance as being the aggregate of matter and form which it is; rather it
provides an account of its proper form (humanity) as deriving from the
proper form of the genus animal (animality) by having been contracted by
the differentia rationality.
Apart from the most general substance, the genus substance, which is
undefinable, every secondary substance is definable and, at least in princi-
ple, definable by us. We are, therefore, at least in principle, capable of
knowing the proper form of any subordinate secondary substance. But, if it
also holds, as Rufus seems to assume that it does, that we can know the proper
form of any subordinate secondary substance only by knowing the definition
of that substance, it follows that we must know the form of the genus sub-
stance. If we did not, we could not define any subordinate secondary sub-
stance. For, to define a given subordinate secondary substance, we need to
know the proper form of the more general substance to which it is immedi-
ately subordinate, and that requirement repeats itself for all the other ever
more general substances to which it is subordinate until the requirement is
reached that the form of the most general substance, the genus substance, be
known. It must be the case, therefore, that this form is not only knowable, but
known by us. Consequently, the proper form of every secondary substance,
16. Species and intermediate genera in the category of substance are linked
with their definitions in such a way that Rufus’s favorite way of referring to them is
by the phrase: “that of which there is a definition (illud cuius est definitio)” (see
Contra Averroem I [“De ideis”], q.6, E fol. 82rb, P fol. 34ra; and Contra Averroem II
[“De causa individuationis”], fol. 85va).
17. This feature of definitions is explicitly recognized by the author of an
anonymous commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, discovered by Peter Raedts
in Assisi, Bib. Com., Ms.138. Although the author of this commentary may not be
Rufus (Professor Wood describes this as a doubtful work), he holds views similar to
those of Rufus. As he explains: “though ‘animal’ indicates a composite of matter
and form, its definition, ‘animated sensible substance’, indicates only a form (Ani-
mal enim dicit compositum ex materia et forma. Sed substantia animata sensibilis
[quae est definitio secundum speciem factam] solum dicit formam . . .)” (fol. 250rb,
ed. R. Wood).
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including that of the most general one, is either known or, at least in princi-
ple, knowable by us. We are, therefore, agents capable, at least in principle, of
adequately naming any secondary substance. It follows that every secondary
substance is adequately nameable.
Let us now turn to an issue which, in Rufus’s eyes, is much more
controversial, that of the adequate nameability of individuals or primary
substances.
2. THE ADEQUATE NAMEABILITY
OF PRIMARY SUBSTANCES
As I have said, Rufus held two different views on the adequate nameability
of individuals or primary substances. We shall consider them in turn.
2.1. Rufus’s First Position
Rufus’s first position on the adequate nameability of primary substances
depends on the metaphysical account of them to which he then subscribed.
Accordingly, let us see in what that account—his first metaphysical account
of individuals or primary substances—consisted.
2.1.1. Metaphysical background The text that contains Rufus’s first
metaphysical account of individuals or primary substances is a very early
treatise—I call it the Urmetaphysics—which predates his Main Metaphysics
Commentary.18 In Urmetaphysics, Rufus accepts a view which he attributes to
Aristotle, as interpreted by Averroes, according to which an individual has
no form over and above those possessed by the ultimate species to which it
is subordinate. An individual does not, therefore, have a proper form.19
What it has in addition is its matter.20 That matter, however, is not the highly
particularized but still common matter of the ultimate species; rather, it is
“signate” matter, that is, fully individualized matter.21
18. The Urmetaphysics is not the only source of information on Rufus’s first
theory of individual substances. In the Contra Averroem, written a few years later, he
describes the theory, or some aspect of it, on several occasions, though he does so
then in order to refute it. His Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, where he subscribes
to a closely related theory, is also helpful. On the Urmetaphysics and the Contra
Averroem, see n. 1.
19. “individuum non habet formam propriam . . .” (Urmetaphysics VII, q. 13,
fol. 49rb).
20. “Si autem Aristoteles putaverit quod illud additum super formam speciei
nihil aliud est quam ipsa substantia materiae primae . . .” (Contra Averroem I [“De
ideis”], ad q. 1, E fol. 84vb, P fol. 36va).
21. “Dicet forte quod additum re vera non est substantia materiae simpliciter
sed sic signata” (Contra Averroem II [“De causa individuationis”], fol. 85va).
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The multiple individuation of an ultimate species, by which that species
is divided into a multitude of individuals, requires, therefore, that the
matter of the species be itself multiply individuated first. But how is the
multiple individuation of the matter of a given ultimate species brought
about? Rufus suggests that it is caused, as it were, by special “virtues,” which
somehow supplement the matter of the species, that matter becoming many
matters, each signate, by being “under” those virtues.22 Each matter which
arises in this way from the common matter of a given ultimate species is
capable of receiving all the forms of that species, its proper form as well as
its shared forms, thus yielding an individual. For example, a given matter
which arises from the common matter of the species man yields an individ-
ual human being by receiving the forms of substantiality, of corporality, of
animality, and finally of humanity.
Each of the forms of a given ultimate species, when received in sig-
nate matter so as to yield an individual, is, however, necessarily “individu-
ated” in the process.23 Since the forms of a given ultimate species are
received in many matters, yielding many individuals, each one is also “mul-
tiplied.”24 This implies, Rufus tells us, that a specific or generic form has
two modes of being. According to one mode of being, it is multipliable,
though not actually multiplied; according to the other, it is actually mul-
tiplied.25 Insofar as a form has the first mode of being, it is common or
universal.26 Insofar as it has the second mode of being, it is, in each of
its occurrences, singular. A form has the first mode of being of itself,27
but it has the second only insofar as it is received in many matters. At-
tempting to make this intuitively intelligible, Rufus uses the analogy of
light which in its source is one, and is multiplied in each part of the
adjoining air. This is thought to imply that light, of itself, is one and
that, to be multiplied, it must be received in the many parts of a medium.
Similarly, he suggests, a form, of itself, is one and general and, to be
22. “principium efficiens individuationis est ipsa virtus exsistens in materia et
haec materia ,corr. ex: virtus. signata est quodammodo secundum quod est sub
virtute tali . . .” (Urmetaphysics VII, q. 11, fol. 49ra).
23. “Nota etiam quod omnis forma quae nata est esse in materia habet indi-
viduari si communitatem habeat et etiam tam forma generis supremi quam infimi
. . .” (Urmetaphysics VII, q. 15, fol. 49rb).
24. “requiritur . . . quod forma nata sit in diversis numerari et multiplicari . .
.” (Urmetaphysics VII, q. 11, fol. 49ra).
25. “Forma enim duplex habet esse: unum esse scilicet secundum quod est
multiplicabilis, et aliud esse secundum quod actu multiplicata est” (Sententia cum
quaestionibus super Physicam Aristotelis, liber II, pars 5, Erfurt, Wiss. Allg., Q. 312, fol.
4vb, ed. R. Wood).
26. The text quoted in the preceding note continues: “Si primo modo consid-
eratur forma, ei debetur communitas . . .”.
27. The same text further continues: “de se enim est forma multiplica-
bilis . . .”.
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multiplied and individuated, it must be received in many matters, each
of which is signate matter.28
Clearly, on this theory, the proper nature of an individual consists solely
in its matter. For the matter of an individual is proper to it, but none of its
forms are. Though all its forms are individuated forms, it has exactly the same
number of forms as does the ultimate species to which it is subordinate. To
have a proper form, it would need to have one additional form.
2.1.2. Knowing and naming Recall that, although the proper nature
of a secondary substance can be identified both with its matter and with its
proper form, an agent cannot bestow a name on the substance by consider-
ing its matter, because, according to Rufus, matter as such is unknowable.29 It
follows, as we have seen, that for a secondary substance to be adequately
named by an agent, the agent has to bestow on it a name by considering its
proper form. But the proper nature of individuals or primary substances, as
Rufus conceived of them in the Urmetaphysics, consists solely in their matter
since they have no proper form. It follows that their proper nature is unknow-
able and that, consequently, they cannot be adequately named.30
Nonetheless, we can, of course, refer to individuals, as Rufus notes.
Given the underlying conception of individuals, it is appropriate to do so
by using a general term, naming the species to which the individual is
subordinate, together with a demonstrative pronoun, designating the form
of the species insofar as that form is made to be spatio-temporally located
by being received in the individual’s matter.31
28. “Intelligamus lumen candelae esse in vacuo sicut punctum. Tunc sic: haec
lux non multiplicat se extra se, sed si poneretur haec lux in plano diaphano, . . .
faceret se extra se et faceret diversas luces numero in diversis partibus aeris . .
. comparetur ergo lux-multiplicitas formae universalis, partes aeris recipientis lu-
cem comparentur materiae, luces receptae comparentur formae individuatae et
multiplicatae per materiam” (Sententia cum quaestionibus super Physicam Aristotelis,
liber II, pars 5, fol. 4vb).
29. This is Rufus’s view in the Urmetaphysics: “si materia per se esset intelligibi-
lis . . . Sed non est sic, sed omne quod est per suam formam intelligitur . . . et non
per materiam” (Urmetaphysics VII q. 13, fol. 49rb). In the Contra Averroem, however,
he admits that matter, “quantum est de se,” is intelligible (Contra Averroem I [“De
ideis”], q.5, E fol. 82ra, P. fol. 33vb and ad q.4 &5, E fol. 84vb, P fol. 36vb).
30. “cum individuum perficitur per materiam, et materia nomen non habet,
ideo individuum nomen proprie non habet” (Urmetaphysics, VII q.13, fol. 49rb).
31. “Si autem Aristoteles putaverit quod illud additum super formam speciei
nihil aliud est quam ipsa substantia materiae primae quae, ut praedictum est,
nomine significabilis non est, quid remanet nisi quod, ut ipse Aristoteles ponat,
individuum nomen habere non posse, sed solum significari oratione composita ex
nomine speciei et pronomine quo pronomine . . .” (Contra Averroem I [“De ideis”],
ad q.1, E fol. 84vb, P. fol. 36va). The idea that a specific form, by being received in
signate matter, is spatio-temporally located (and thereby capable of being pointed
to by the user of a demonstrative pronoun) is contained in the anonymous com-
mentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics referred to in n. 17 above. As its author, who
subscribed to the same metaphysical account of individuals that Rufus first sub-
scribed to, says: “materia facit formam esse hic et nunc” (fol. 250va).
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2.2. Rufus’s Second Position
When he wrote the Contra Averroem, just a few years after writing the Ur-
metaphysics,32 Rufus had already abandoned the conception of primary sub-
stances to which he initially subscribed, maintaining instead a very different
metaphysical account. This new account called in turn for a new response to
the question whether primary substances can be adequately named. Let us
start, then, by looking at Rufus’s second account of primary substances.
2.2.1. Metaphysical background On that second account, Rufus no
longer believes that the only thing that an individual has in addition to the
forms of the ultimate species to which it is subordinate is signate matter.33
He now believes that it has two things in addition: signate matter and a
form, which, because it is proper to the individual, is called an “individual
form.” And, although he still thinks that certain added “virtues” make the
matter of a given ultimate species become many matters, each signate, he
no longer thinks that these virtues are added to the matter itself. Rather,
they are, he now thinks, virtues added to the proper form of the ultimate
species. And each added virtue acts first on that specific form, “contracting”
it, as it were, so that a new form, an individual form, arises. In the process,
however, the added virtue also acts on the matter of the ultimate species,
making it more particular to the extent of rendering it signate.34 In this way
an individual arises that has both an individual form and signate matter, the
form being the “perfection” of the matter.35
As on the earlier account, the individual has, of course, other forms as
well, namely all the forms of the ultimate species from which it originates.
And again, as on the earlier account, by existing in its matter, which is
signate matter, those forms are no longer common, but individuated.36 On
the earlier account, however, the individual does not have a proper form;
on the later account it does.
32. See n. 1.
33. “Secundum igitur hoc patet quod ultimum additum post formam speciei
specialissimae non est materiae substantia. Nec potest dici, ut prius visum est, quod
sit substantia materiae in ultimatate suae signata. Hoc enim est quod ego modo
quaero: quid eam signavit in ultimatate suae signationis, scilicet postquam eam
signavit forma speciei specialissimae?” (Contra Averroem II [“De causa individu-
ationis”], fol. 85va).
34. “Talis igitur potentia addita ipsam formam speciei specialissimae commu-
nem contrahit, et sic, in contrahendo formam, signat et materiam quae fuit alteram
pars compositi sive aggregati cuius est definitio in ultimitate signationis” (Contra
Averroem II [“De causa individuationis”], fol. 85va).
35. “Igitur potentiae diversae, additae super formam speciei specialissimae,
per quas fiunt in ipsa forma speciei specialissimae diversarum materiarum in sua
ultimatate signatarum diversae perfectiones, diversa individua efficiunt” (Contra
Averroem II [“De causa individuationis”], fol. 85va).
36. “natura communis . . . prout est in materia extra intellectum . . . est singu-
lare . . .” (Contra Averroem I [“De ideis”], q.6, E fol. 82va, P fol. 34rb).
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One is tempted to draw an analogy between the way in which the many
virtues, added to the proper form of a given ultimate species, determine the
division of that species into individuals, and the way in which opposite
differentiae determine the division of a genus into two species. There is
indeed an analogy there to be drawn. Nevertheless, there is also a difference
which, as we shall see in the next section, is of momentous importance:
whereas differentiae always come in pairs, always determining the division
of a genus into two opposite species, the virtues, added to the form of an
ultimate species, are very many in number, determining the division of the
species into a multitude of individuals. Rufus does not rule out that there
may even be infinitely many virtues added to a given ultimate species,
determining the division of the species into infinitely many individuals,
though he thinks it unlikely that there are infinitely many individuals.37 In
any case, being a great many and not just two, the added virtues are simply
diverse from each other, not opposites as are the differentiae which deter-
mine the division of a genus.38 So there is an analogy, but also a difference
between differentiae and added virtues.
However that may be, on this second conception of individuals or
primary substances, a primary substance, like a secondary substance, has
both its proper matter and its proper form. Let us see what the conse-
quences are for the possibility of adequately naming primary substances.
2.2.2. Knowing and naming On the preceding conception of primary
substances, it is impossible to adequately name a primary substance, since its
proper nature consisted solely in its matter and matter as such is unknowable.
But, on this conception, the proper nature of a primary substance can be
identified both with its matter and with its proper form. Now, the form of a
thing is eminently knowable, since its form is, according to Rufus, the princi-
ple of a thing’s intelligibility.39 The condition required on the part of a thing
for it to be adequately nameable is thus fulfilled by a primary substance, as
Rufus now conceives of it, since it has a proper nature that is knowable.40
It does not follow, however, that primary substances are adequately
nameable. For, though they each have their own proper form which, as far
as it is concerned, is knowable, it might be the case that no agent exists who
is capable of knowing it, in which case they would still fail to be adequately
37. “Quaero igitur an infinita numero individua possint esse sub una specie
specialissima in rerum natura extra intellectum . . . Quod si infinita sicut videntur
velle philosophi . . . Et si tu non sic ordinasti; sed forte decentius, scilicet quod sint
numero certo individua determinata . . .” (Contra Averroem I [“De ideis”], ad q. 1, E
fol. 84va, P fol. 36rb–36va).
38. “Dictae vero virtutes vel differentiae sic non sunt neque sibi contraria, licet
diversae” (Contra Averroem II [“De causa individuationis”], fol. 86ra).
39 “cum forma sit principium intelligendi rem . . .” (Urmetaphysics VII, q. 13,
fol. 49rb).
40. “Ipsa [individua] tamen se ipsis quantum est de se nomine significari, si
addita super formam speciei, ipsa individua constituentia, formae sint, non video
quid obstet” (Contra Averroem I [“De ideis”], ad q.1, E fol. 84vb, P fol. 36va).
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nameable. As a matter of fact, Rufus believes, the knowledge of the proper
form of a primary substance is something of which we humans are incapa-
ble. Why should that be?
It is obvious enough that, acquainted as we are with a number of indi-
viduals, nevertheless, their proper nature, and thus their proper form, if that
be what their proper nature is, escapes us. Yet the fact needs explanation, and
the explanation Rufus provides is, I think, quite an extraordinary one. He ar-
gues as follows. If we knew individual forms, we would know them in a way
analogous to that in which we know specific forms. But, it will be recalled, we
know a specific form, according to Rufus, by knowing the definition of the
species of which it is the proper form. For example, we know the form human-
ity by knowing the definition of man, which is “rational animal.” For that defi-
nition tells us that the species man, or rather its proper form humanity, arises
from the genus animal through the contraction by the differentia rationality
of its proper form animality. So, if we know that definition, we have a meta-
physical account of the form humanity, and to know the form humanity is to
have such an account. Assuming that knowledge of individual forms is similar
to knowledge of specific forms, Rufus infers that we could know an individual
form only by having a metaphysical account of it, which we could have only by
knowing the definition of the individual whose proper form it is.
But are individuals definable? In a loose sense, they are. For there are
items that fill the roles for individuals that a genus and a differentia fill in
the definition of a species. The ultimate species, under which a given
individual is subsumed, fills the role of the genus, and the relevant virtue,
added to the most specific form, by which that form has been contracted so
as to yield an individual form and thereby an individual, fills the role of the
differentia.41 Thus, a definition, or at least an account analogous to a
definition,  a  “quasi-definition,”  we  might say,  can be provided  for any
individual substance, given the way Rufus now conceives them.42 But are the
virtues that determine the division of a given ultimate species knowable by
us? Rufus thinks not. His reason is that there are simply too many of them,
41. “Et quid manifestius ex dictis sequi videtur quam quod individua defini-
tionem habere possunt. Accepta enim forma speciei, accepta etiam virtute vel
potentia quae ei addita Socratem constituit, plenaria videtur Socratis esse definitio:
forma speciei tamquam genus, dicta virtus vel potentia tamquam differentia. Et ita
de aliis individuis, quare omnino eodem modo videtur individui esse definitio sicut
et speciei” (Contra Averroem II [“De causa individuationis”], fol. 86ra).
42. Conceding that a definition, properly speaking, is always by a genus and a
differentia, and that true differentiae come in pairs of opposites, Rufus grants that
there can be no definition, properly speaking, of an individual. As he writes:
“Dicimus enim proprie definitionem ex vera differentia essentiali et ex vero gen-
ere—differentia, dico, habente aliam sibi contrariam id condividentem” (Contra
Averroem II [“De causa individuationis”], fol. 86ra). Nevertheless, an account analo-
gous to a definition, a “quasi-definition,” as we shall say, or a “declaration,” as he
says, can be given of an individual in terms its ultimate species and of its contracting
“virtue” (“Aut forte erit ipsius individui aliqua declaratio, nec tamen definitio”).
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since, as we have seen, they are so numerous that, as far as anyone can tell,
there might be infinitely many. But the human intellect is not capable of
distinctly grasping an infinity of things, or even a large multitude of them.43
It might be objected that, from the fact that we cannot know all the
virtues which together determine the division of a given ultimate species, it
does not follow that we cannot know any of them. But Rufus thinks that it
does.44 For it is essential to each of the virtues added to the form of a given
ultimate species that, together with the others, it should determine the
division of that species in the same way as it is essential to each differentia
in a pair of opposite differentiae that, together with its opposite, it should
determine the division of a given genus. In the case of differentiae, it follows
that no differentia can be adequately known unless the opposite differentia
which, together with it, determines the division of a genus, is also known.
Similarly, Rufus believes, in the case of virtues added to the form of an
ultimate species, it follows that none of these virtues can be adequately
known unless all the others which, together with it, determine the division
of the ultimate species, are also known.45 Since it is impossible for us to
know them all, it is, then, impossible for us to know any.46
In this way, Rufus believes he has established that none of the virtues
added to a given ultimate species can be known by us. But if that is so,
although individuals are definable or quasi-definable, it follows that their
definition is not available to us. For every such definition (or quasi-defini-
tion) mentions, in the role of the genus, an ultimate species and, in the role
of the differentia, one of the virtues added to the form of that species. And
we would need to know both the ultimate species and the virtue for there
to be mention of them in a definition available to us. But, if the definition
(or quasi-definition) of an individual is not available to us, we also do not
know its proper form, because we lack a metaphysical account of it.
43. “sed a nostro intellectu non sunt scita infinita . . . Et si tu forte non sic ordi-
nasti, sed forte decentius, scilicet quod sint numero certo individua determinata,
idem apud nos relinquitur quod prius. In tanta enim multitudine sunt quod nec nu-
merum illum, nec per consequens causas distinguentes, efficientes illa singularia
novimus” (Contra Averroem I [“De ideis”], ad q.1, E fol. 84va, P fol. 36rb–36va).
44. “Cum inquam, sit sic, scilicet quod non possint sciri vel intelligi propria
constituentia hoc individuum [i.e. additum super formam speciei efficiens hoc
individuum cum hac materia] quin et sint scita propria constituentia alia individua
omnia . . .” (Contra Averroem I [“De ideis”], ad q.1, E fol. 84va, P fol. 36rb).
45. “Nonne doces hic respondere quod quaecumque prima divisione a se ipsis
dividuntur, necesse est, cognito uno, et omnia alia cognosci. Cognito enim uno
membro unius divisionis, cognoscuntur et alia membra . . . Exemplum patet in
divisione animalis per rationale et irrationale . . . De divisione vero speciei special-
issimae ita est quod omnia, sive sint finita sive infinita, immediate contra se prima
divisione proveniunt. Et ideo in his indubitanter videtur quod intellecto uno addito
unum individuum constituente, intelligantur et omnia alia addita” (Contra Averroem
I [“De ideis”], ad q. 1, E fol. 84va–84vb, P fol. 36va).
46. The text quoted in the preceding note continues: “Quod, quia nobis in
hoc statu non est [possibile] . . .”
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Such is the complex argument by which Rufus establishes that we
humans cannot know an individual’s proper form. But, since we cannot
know its proper matter either, it follows that we cannot know an individual’s
proper nature. And from that it follows that we cannot adequately name an
individual.47
From the fact that individuals cannot be adequately named by us, it
does not follow that they cannot be adequately named at all, however. For
there may be other agents who are capable of knowing the proper forms of
individuals or primary substances, and thus capable of adequately naming
them. Indeed, Rufus is convinced that there necessarily exists at least one
such agent, namely God. For, as a Christian, he believes not only in God’s
necessary existence but also that he is necessarily omniscient.48 There is,
then, nothing He cannot know. Moreover, in the particular case of the
proper forms of individuals, the argument given to prove that we humans
cannot know them does not apply to God. For even if we are incapable of
knowing an infinity of things, God, who is himself infinite and thus com-
mensurate with the infinite, is not.49 There is, then, no possible doubt that
God can, indeed does, know each individual and, for each individual, its
proper form. Consequently, if He so wills, He can adequately name any and
every individual.50 It follows that individuals, or primary substances, are
adequately nameable.
Rufus further suggests that there may be agents other than God capa-
ble of knowing the proper form of an individual and, consequently, of
adequately naming the individual, and that even we may be capable of this,
though not in this life. For Rufus holds that any existing entity whatsoever,
even a proper constituent of a primary substance, in particular its proper
form, is, of itself, capable of being known by any intellect, including ours.51
47. “relinquitur quod nullius individui constituentia a nobis scita sint; quare
nec a nobis nomine significabilia; . . . remanet ut eis [individuis] nomina nequeamus
imponere” (Contra Averroem I [“De ideis”], ad q. 1,E fol. 84va–84vb, P fol. 36rb–36va).
48. On the philosophically interesting thirteenth-century theological debate
on whether there are many divine ideas, a debate fueled by the belief that the God
revealed in the Scriptures is an omniscient God, who therefore knows a great
multitude of things, both universal and individual, see Rega Wood: “Distinct Ideas
and Perfect Solicitude: Alexander of Hales, Richard Rufus and Odo Rigaldus,”
Franciscan Studies 53 (1993): 7–46.
49. “A te autem cui infinita sunt finita . . .” (Contra Averroem I [“De ideis”], ad
q. 1, E fol. 84va, P fol. 36rb).
50. “A te autem cui infinita sunt finita non video quare, si tibi placet, non sint
nomine significabilia” (Contra Averroem I [“De ideis”], ad q.1, E fol. 84va, P fol.
36rb).
51. “omne ens et natura essentialiter est intelligibile ab intellectu primo,
simpliciter autem et quantum est de se, ab intellectu causato” (Contra Averroem I
[“De ideis”], ad q.1, E fol. 84rb, P fol. 36rb). “Immo erit universaliter omnis creatura
intelligibilis . . . nam et eius principia omnia, sive communia sive propria, vere et
simpliciter sunt scibilia et intelligibilia” (Speculum animae, q.4, Erfurt, Wiss. Allg.,
Q312, fol. 109va, Assisi, Bib. Com., Ms. 138, fol. 283va, ed., R. Wood).
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Consequently, he suggests, if things exist that we are not capable of know-
ing, it is because of some deficiency from which our intellect suffers.52 And
he further suggests that this deficiency may be linked to “our present
state.”53
From the fact that we are incapable, at least in this life, of knowing their
proper forms, it does not follow that we do not, in this life, know any
individuals. For a thing can be known, even if its proper nature cannot. And
we do know individuals in this life, namely by some of their accidental
properties.54 We can, of course, use this knowledge to bestow a name on an
individual thing, although we shall not be thereby adequately naming the
thing. Rufus says that in such a case the name is not properly a name of the
thing, a “nomen rei,” but is bestowed on the thing accidently as it were.55 He
terms it a “nomen vocis,” a phrase normally used in a quite different sense.
The so-called proper names, by which people are called, exemplify “nomina
vocis” in this sense.56 Since they do not adequately name their objects, they
are, as Rufus might say, anything but “proper.”57
CONCLUSION
We have here, I suggest, an instance of an extraordinary development,
occurring within just a few years in the writings of this thirteenth-century
author. It consists of two phases. In the first, an Aristotelian theory—as
contained in texts which, for the most part, had only recently become
available in Latin translation—is first painstakenly explicated and recon-
structed.58 This phase is illustrated in Rufus’s Urmetaphysics where he pro-
vides the basis for the claim, which he finds in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, that
individuals cannot be (adequately) named.59 The next phase consists of
52. “omnis creatura vere intelligibilis, et ab intellectu primo et ab intellectu
creato, nisi sit defectus a parte nostri intellectus.” (Speculum animae, q.4, fol. 283va).
53. See the quotation in n. 46.
54. “quia formae individuales substantiales latent nos, ideo eas per accidentia
intelligimus et significamus . . .” (Lectura Parisiensis . . . II d.3 a.2 q.2 [“De causa
individuationis”], fol. 146va).
55. “a casu,” as Rufus says. See n. 56 below.
56. “iste vocatur Sortes vel Plato . . . talia sunt nomina vocis et non rei; non
enim considerant naturam impositionis per naturam rei, sed a casu . . .” (Ur-
metaphysics VII, q.13, fol. 49rb).
57. See the introduction to this essay.
58. Here I understand “Aristotelian theory” not in the strict sense of a theory
contained in the writings of Aristotle, but in the wider sense of a theory contained
(or thought to be contained) in the writings of Aristotle and/or in writings by other
authors purporting to complete or comment on Aristotle’s doctrines, including
Porphyry and Arab commentators of Aristotle, notably Avicenna and Averroes.
59. “Quid remanet nisi, ut ipse Aristoteles ponat, individuum nomen habere
non posse . . .” (Contra Averroem I [“De ideis”], ad q.1, E fol. 84vb, P fol. 36va). The
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modifying the reconstructed Aristotelian doctrine so that it accomodates
the Christian faith with its dogma of God’s omniscience. This phase is
illustrated in the Contra Averroem, where Rufus modifies the Aristotelian
doctrine on the (adequate) naming of individuals. The result is a doctrine
according to which individuals are adequately nameable by God, though
not by us, at  least not  in this life. In the new  doctrine,  much of  the
Aristotelian doctrine is retained, but a partly theological content is now
given to a doctrine which was, originally, purely philosophical. The new
doctrine is a striking example of “Christian Aristotelianism.”
Aristotelian text which Rufus has in mind is Metaphysics VII 1035 b2. In the transla-
tion of Michael Scot, the text reads: “particularia enim non habent proprium
nomen.” Note, as a curiosity, the fact that Roger Bacon, in “De signis,” violently
attacked those who, misled, he says, by a defective translation, had attributed that
doctrine, entirely wrong-headed in his opinion, to Aristotle (“An unedited part of
Bacon’s ‘Opus Maius’, ‘De signis’,” ed. K. Fredborg et al. Traditio, XXXIV (1978):
75–136, §§ 23–24). Although Rufus is not named here, is this another instance of
Bacon’s attacks on a thinker he intensely disliked?
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